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 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Everett Gottardi was detained, frisked, and searched while Boise Police officers 
served an out-of-state arrest warrant upon a woman he knew.  In his Appellant’s Brief, 
Mr. Gottardi asserted that his initial warrantless detention was unreasonable and, 
alternatively, even if his initial detention was lawful, the pat-down search that followed 
was unreasonable, and thus the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.  
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State raises various arguments either in support of the 
district court’s findings or asking this Court to create a new exception to the warrant 
requirement.  This Reply Brief is necessary to address some of these arguments. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Gottardi’s Appellant’s Brief and are repeated in this Reply Brief only where 
necessary to address a specific claim raised by the State. 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Gottardi’s motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Gottardi’s Motion To Suppress 
 
 Officer Wittmuss lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion that Mr. Gottardi 
either had been or was about to be engaged in criminal activity at the time he detained 
him.  As such, the detention violated Mr. Gottardi’s Fourth Amendment right to be free 
from unreasonable seizures and the district court erred in denying Mr. Gottardi’s motion 
to suppress on that basis.  Alternatively, even if the initial detention was lawful, Officer 
Wittmuss lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion that Mr. Gottardi was armed and 
presently dangerous; thus, his pat-down and subsequent search violated Mr. Gottardi’s 
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and the 
district court erred in denying Mr. Gottardi’s motion to suppress on that basis. 
 
A. Regardless Of When It First Occurred, Mr. Gottardi’s Warrantless Seizure 
Violated His Fourth Amendment Rights  
 
 The State first takes issue with the question of when Mr. Gottardi was seized.  
(Respondent’s Brief, pp.7-9.)  Arguing that Mr. Gottardi failed to “identify at what point 
he believes an unlawful seizure occurred” in either his Appellant’s Brief1 or in the district 
court, the State claims that no seizure actually occurred until the pat-down.  Id.  While 
Mr. Gottardi acknowledges that his trial counsel was perhaps inarticulate in identifying a 
specific point at which the seizure occurred, the district court assumed that the seizure 
occurred at the point Officer Wittmuss approached him at the front door of Ms. Green’s 
                                            
1 Although not included in the Argument section of his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Gottardi 
noted “[i]t appears the court found that Mr. Gottardi was lawfully seized ‘when [Officer 
Wittmuss] approached Mr. Gottardi and went with him to the front – the porch and 
knocked – both of them knocked[.]’” (See Appellant’s Brief, p.5, fn. 1 (quoting Tr. 4/1/15, 
p.85, Ls.9-12).) 
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apartment and told him to “stand back.”  After stating “this is at most an investigative 
detention” and articulating the relevant standards of review, the district court stated 
“Well, what did the officer have when he approached Mr. Gottardi and went with him to 
the front – the front porch and knocked[.]”  (Tr. 4/1/15, p.82, L.25 – p.85, L.11.)  The 
district court went on to describe what the officer knew at the time of the seizure 
including that Mr. Gottardi knew Ms. Green, who was wanted on drug related charges; 
that Mr. Gottardi had consumed alcohol while outside of Ms. Green’s residence; and 
that Mr. Gottardi was dropped off on the street when he returned after leaving the 
residence on foot and walking towards a convenience store.  (Tr. 4/1/15, p.85, L.19 – 
p.87, L.4.)  Thus, Mr. Gottardi asserts that, as the district court apparently found, his 
seizure occurred when Officer Wittmuss made contact with him on the front porch and 
ordered him to stand back.  
 In any event, even if no seizure occurred until the pat-down, Officer Wittmuss did 
not learn any additional information that would support a reasonable suspicion that 
Mr. Gottardi was or had been engaged in criminal activity.  While Ms. Green was 
uncooperative and unruly, Mr. Gottardi was not.  (Tr. 4/1/15, p.34, L.16 – p.35, L.11; 
p.37, L.19 – p.38, L.12).  There was simply no legal basis to detain Mr. Gottardi whether 
it occurred on the porch when he knocked on Ms. Green’s door, or when the pat-down 
occurred a few moments later. 
  
B. Neither Officer WItmuss Nor The District Court Articulated What Criminal Activity 
Mr. Gottardi Was Suspected Of Engaging In, And The District Court’s Failure To 
Do So Is Legally Relevant 
 
 The State next takes issue with Mr. Gottardi’s observation that neither Officer 
Wittmuss nor the district court articulated what criminal activity Mr. Gottardi was 
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suspected of engaging in, calling it both “factually incorrect and legally irrelevant.”  
(Respondent’s Brief, p.9 (citing Appellant’s Brief, p.11).)  The State argues that “neither 
the district court nor Officer Wittmuss were required to ‘articulate’ any specific ‘criminal 
activity.’”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.9.)  For its “legally irrelevant” argument, the State 
submits, 
“[R]easonable suspicion does not require a belief that any specific criminal 
activity is afoot to justify an investigative detention.”  State v. Perez-Jungo, 
156 Idaho 609, 615, 329 P.3d 391, 397 (Ct. App. 2014) (emphasis 
original, citations omitted).  “[A]ll that is required is a showing of objective 
and specific articulable facts giving reason to believe that the individual 
has been or is about to be involved in some criminal activity.”  Id.  
(emphasis original, citations omitted). 
 
(Respondent’s Brief, p.9 (internal citations original).)  To the extent that the State argues 
that an officer need not name the specific crime he suspected the detainee to be 
involved in, Mr. Gottardi does not take issue with that contention, for reasonable 
suspicion is an objective standard subject to free review.  Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-
23 (1968).2  However, the officer must still articulate facts supporting an objectively 
reasonable articulable suspicion that the individual has been or is about to be engaged 
in actual criminal activity, not just suspicious behavior, for “[a]nything less would invite 
intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial 
than inarticulate hunches, a result [The Supreme] Court [of the United States] has 
                                            
2 To the extent the State asserts that a warrantless seizure is justified even where the 
facts the officer knew do not support an objectively reasonable suspicion that the 
person detained was or has been engaged in criminal activity, rather than just 
amounting to “suspicious behavior,” the Perez-Jungo Court’s holding does not support 
that contention.  The officer in that case articulated specific facts supporting a 
reasonable suspicion that the defendant was involved “in either impaired driving or 
illegal drug activity.”  Perez-Jungo, 156 Idaho at 615.  The Perez-Jungo Court did not 
hold that an officer’s ability or inability to articulate specific facts that support an 
objectively reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is “legally irrelevant.” 
 6 
consistently refused to sanction.”  Id. 392 U.S. at 22.  Thus, Officer Wittmuss’ 
description of the circumstances surrounding his seizure of Mr. Gottardi are, in fact, 
legally relevant.  
 As for its “factually incorrect” claim, the State asserted that, “It was clear from 
Officer Wittmuss’s testimony that he believed, based on his training and experience, 
that Gottardi’s behavior was suspicious for drug activity.”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.9.)  To 
support its conclusion, the State quoted extensively from both Officer Wittmuss’ 
testimony about why he was suspicion and the district court’s articulation of what Officer 
Wittmuss testified he observed. (Respondent’s Brief, pp.9-11.)   
However, Officer Wittmuss never testified that he suspected Mr. Gottardi was 
actually engaging in illegal drug activity at that time.  (Tr. 4/1/15, p.6, L.1 – p.57, L.10.)  
Officer Wittmuss simply testified that “a lot of times” drug deals happen in a short 
amount of time and involve someone being dropped off on the street in front of their 
apartment complex, rather than in the parking lot right in front of their apartment.  (See 
Tr. 4/1/15, p.19, Ls.1-10.)  While Officer Wittmuss testified that he thought Mr. Gottardi’s 
supposed “lookout behavior, the looking around,” “as opposed to just casual behavior” 
was “odd” to him (Tr. 4/1/15, p.18, L,19 – p.19, L.14), Officer Wittmuss never testified 
that this oddity was part and parcel with suspicion that Mr. Gottardi was actually 
engaged in actual criminal activity.  Officer Wittmuss had a hunch, not an objectively 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and, to his credit, he did not attempt to state 
otherwise.  (Tr. 4/1/15, p.6, L.1 – p.57, L.10.)   
More importantly, despite the State’s claim that the “district court made factual 
findings along those same lines” (Respondent’s Brief, p.10), the district court never 
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articulated what criminal activity the facts demonstrated there was a reasonable 
suspicion Mr. Gottardi was engaged in, let alone “drug activity” or “harboring a fugitive” 
as the State now claims on appeal.  (Tr. 4/1/15, p.82, L.9 – p.94, L.5.)  Instead the Court 
merely articulated that it found Officer Wittmuss’ testimony to be credible and, thus, his 
factual assertions to be true, and the court then concluded,  
So I find that there’s – that the detention such as it was temporary, 
it was limited, and it did not last any longer than to effectuate the purpose 
of the stop.  And there’s case law that says individuals found on the 
premises at the inception of the search and whose identity in connection 
to the premises are unknown may be detained for a time necessary to 
determine those facts and protect the safety of those present during the 
detention. 
 
Although an investigative detention may last – must ordinarily last 
no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop, a 
detention initiated for one investigative purpose may disclose suspicious 
circumstances which may justify expanding the investigation. 
 
So based on what the officer had, I don’t think that the detention 
such as it was violated Mr. Gottardi’s constitutional rights. 
 
(Tr. 4/1/15, p.87, Ls.5-23.)  At no time did the district court articulate that it found the 
“purpose of the stop” to be investigating Mr. Gottardi for suspected “drug activity” or, as 
the State also appears to claim, “harboring a fugitive.”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.11.)   
Rather the district court’s own words demonstrate that it found Officer Wittmuss could 
detain Mr. Gottardi because he was “found on the premises at the inception of the 
search.”3  
 Even if the words spoken by the district court quoted above could be construed 
as a holding that Officer Wittmuss could detain Mr. Gottardi on suspicion of drug activity
                                            
3 Although it should be obvious, the officers were not conducting a search of a premises 
– they were effecting an arrest warrant.    
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or harboring a fugitive, the State provides no appellate argument that this purported 
holding in legally correct.  (Respondent’s Brief, pp.9-11.)  Instead, in a footnote, the 
State makes the following conclusory statement: 
Gottardi’s behavior and his obvious personal relationship with Green, in 
conjunction with the fact Green was wanted on a warrant for drug crimes, 
are specific articulable facts that justify suspicion that Gottardi, in addition 
to being involved in drug activity, had knowledge of Green’s status and 
was harboring her. 
 
(Respondent’s Brief, p.11, fn.4.)  Assuming that the State means to simply adopt the 
district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law as its appellate argument, the 
State’s argument has no merit for the reasons articulated in Mr. Gottardi’s Appellant’s 
Brief.4  (See Appellant’s Brief, pp.11-12.) 
  
C. Mr. Gottardi’s Detention Cannot Be Justified Solely On The Basis Of His 
Proximity To Ms. Green When She Was Arrested And This Court Should Reject 
The State’s Request That It Create A New Exception To The Warrant 
Requirement  
 
 The State asks this Court to create a knew exception to the warrant requirement.  
The district court stated that “there’s case law that says individuals found on the 
premises at the inception of the search and whose identity in connection to the 
premises are unknown may be detained for a time necessary to determine those facts 
and protect the safety of those present during the detention.”  (Tr. 4/15/15, p.87, Ls.8-
                                            
4 The State does not offer any support for its claim that having a personal relationship 
with someone who has an out-of-state warrant and acting “oddly” in the eyes of an 
officer, supports a reasonable suspicion that that person is “harboring a fugitive.”  There 
was simply no evidence presented to suggest that Mr. Gottardi knew that Ms. Green 
committed a felon, that she had been charged with committing a felony, and that he was 
trying to harbor and protect her.  See I.C. § 18-205(2).  If proximity to suspected and/or 
wanted felons and acting strangely were enough to raise a suspicion that an individual 
is violating I.C. § 18-205, criminal defense attorneys would undoubtedly find themselves 
routinely detained by police officers.   
 9 
14.)  The State recognizes that the precedent the district court apparently relied upon 
does not actually apply where an arrest warrant, rather than a search warrant, was 
being served, but it now argues that this Court should extend such precedent to arrest 
warrants.  (Respondent’s Brief, pp.11-16.)  For multiple reasons, the State’s argument is 
without merit. 
 A search warrant provides officers with an objectively reasonable basis to detain 
individuals found on or near the premises to be searched, in order to determine the 
individuals’ relationships to the premises and any potential evidence of criminal activity 
found during the execution of the search warrant.  See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 
692 (1981).  “The connection of an occupant to that home gives the police officer an 
easily identifiable and certain basis for determining that suspicion of criminal activity 
justifies a detention of that occupant.”  Id. at 703-04.  The State recognizes that this 
precedent does not, in and of itself, justify Mr. Gottardi’s seizure, and impliedly agrees 
with Mr. Gottardi’s argument that the district court erred in finding the seizure was 
justified on this basis.  (Respondent’s Brief, p.11.)   Notably, the officers were not 
“searching” the premises Mr. Gottardi was found on and, thus, his seizure could not be 
justified on the basis of a determining his connection to the property.  The State argues 
that such precedent should be extended, however, for officer safety concerns.  
(Respondent’s Brief, pp.11-16.)   
 As an initial matter, unless falling under a “well-recognized exception” to the 
warrant requirement, warrantless seizures are per se unreasonable and violate the 
Fourth Amendment rights of the person seized.  See Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967); 
see also Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).  The State implicitly concedes 
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that seizing a person who is nearby when an arrest warrant is effectuated upon another 
is not a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement by virtue of the State’s 
failure to cite any precedent from either the United States Supreme Court or the Idaho 
Supreme Court that holds such a seizure is justified, and its request that this Court 
extend Summers to cover this scenario.  (Respondent’s Brief, pp.11-16.)  Thus, as a 
matter of law, Mr. Gottardi’s warrantless seizure was unreasonable as it was not 
effectuated pursuant to a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement. 
 The State cites to various opinions from other jurisdictions and argues that many 
courts “have ‘concluded that officers entering a residence to execute an arrest warrant 
may constitutionally detain the occupants of the residence for a period of time 
necessary to safely effectuate the arrest.’”  (Respondents Brief, p.14 (quoting Adams v. 
Springmeyer, 17 F.Supp.3d 478, 502 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (further citations omitted.)  The 
State argues “such limited detentions are justified when balanced against the legitimate 
governmental interest in officer safety.”  (Respondent’s Brief, p.14 (citations omitted).)  
Not only are the opinions the State relies upon non-binding, they are also not 
persuasive in the context of what transpired in the present case.5    
First, Officer Wittmuss did not “enter” Ms. Green’s residence to effect the arrest 
warrant – he just went to her front porch and told her she was under arrest when she 
                                            
5 Mr. Gottardi understands the State’s argument to be that the cases it cites support its 
argument that when officers attempt to serve an arrest warrant inside a residence, 
officer safety concerns justify seizing the occupants inside that residence while arresting 
the wanted individual.  Mr. Gottardi has chosen to follow the State’s lead and not 
actually analyze the factual and legal backgrounds upon which those cases are based, 
as the State does not appear to claim that those cases involve a factual scenario or 
course of proceedings that are on-point to the present case, and it is sufficient to note 
that none of those cases hold that an officer may detain a person found in a public place 
who happens to be nearby when an arrest is made pursuant to an arrest warrant.   
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answered the door. Along those same lines, Mr. Gottardi was not an “occupant of the 
residence” when the arrest happened; rather, he was on the front porch, having already 
knocked on the door, when the officers detained him and arrested Ms. Green.   
Most importantly, any claim that Officer Wittmuss was justified in seizing 
Mr. Gottardi due to the inherent possibility of danger to him due is belied by the fact that 
any perceived danger was the result of Officer Wittmuss’ own affirmative decision to 
arrest Ms. Green when Mr. Gottardi was standing nearby.  Officer Wittmuss testified 
that Mr. Gottardi had walked down the street to a convenience store and was gone for 
about 10 minutes before returning, yet he “devise[d] a plan” to wait for Mr. Gottardi to 
return and allow him to go to the door and knock so that Ms. Green would “come to the 
door” and not pretend that “nobody was home.”  (Tr., p.13 L.11 – p.15, L.25.)  Any 
theoretical danger was created by Officer Wittmuss’ choice to use Mr. Gottardi as a tool 
in his ruse to get Ms. Green to open the door.  As the late Justice Scalia noted, “if an 
officer leaves a suspect unrestrained nearby just to manufacture authority to search 
[incident to arrest], one could argue that the search is unreasonable precisely because 
the dangerous conditions justifying it existed only by virtue of the officer's failure to 
follow sensible procedures.”  Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (2004) (J. 
Scalia concurring in the judgment.)  Officer Wittmuss (and the two other officers with 
him) could have arrested Ms. Green when Mr. Gottardi was away from the apartment 
she occupied; instead, they purposefully waited until Mr. Gottardi returned.  The State’s 
claim that Officer Wittmuss needed to then detain Mr. Gottardi in order to assure his 
own safety lacks sincerity.  
 12 
D. The Warrantless Pat-Down Search Violated Mr. Gottardi’s Right To Be Free 
From Unreasonable Searches And The Evidence Seized And Statements Made 
Were Fruits Of The Illegality And The District Court Erred In Denying 
Mr. Gottardi’s Motion To Suppress 
 
The State’s final argument is that the pat-search was justified is unremarkable 
and Mr. Gottardi relies upon the arguments he made in his Appellant’s Brief in support 
of his claim that the pat-search was not reasonable.  (See Appellant’s Brief, pp.13-16.)  
Furthermore, for the reasons stated in his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Gottardi asserts that the 
evidence seized and incriminating statements he made were fruits the violation of his 
Fourth Amendment Rights and the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress.  
(See Appellant’s Brief, pp.15-16.) 
      
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Gottardi respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of 
conviction, reverse the order denying motion to suppress, and remand his case to the 
district court. 
 DATED this 23rd day of May, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      JASON C. PINTLER 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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